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1   Introduction 
The question on whether demographic changes, and their corresponding implications for 
population growth, are inherently linked to environmental issues is by no means a new one. 
In the past, many analysts have argued that population growth contributes to the decay of 
the natural environment as it has been associated with such problems as deforestation; air 
and water pollution; global warming; increased waste etc (see Meadows et al. 1972; Ehrlich 
and Ehrlich 1990). Others have opted for a less pessimistic argument, based on empirical 
studies supporting the view that the quantitative effect of population growth on pollution, 
despite being statistically significant, is relatively small (see, for example, Preston 1996). What 
is common among these views is the underlying idea that the causality on the nexus between 
population growth and environment quality runs from the former to the latter.  
     In this paper, we develop an economic theory to illustrate how and why environmental factors 
may actually cause changes in some important demographic aspects. Our analysis is motivated by the 
striking demographic changes that occurred in industrialised economies during the second 
half of the last century – changes such as greater life expectancy; reduced mortality; and 
lower fertility rates.
1 Existing theories that have sought to explain the joint determination of 
economic growth, fertility, longevity and mortality have absconded from issues pertaining to 
environmental quality (e.g., Blackburn and Cipriani 2002; Lagerlöf 2003; Zhang and Zhang 
2005;  Cervelatti  and  Sunde  2007).  Other  theoretical  analyses  have  incorporated 
environmental  quality  in  models  of  growth  and  (endogenous)  life  expectancy  but  have 
neglected the issue of fertility choices (e.g., Pautrel 2009; Mariani et al. 2010; Varvarigos 
2010; Jouvet et al. 2010). A recent strand of literature that examines the interactions between 
pollution and optimal fertility choices employ representative agent models where mortality 
and life expectancy are exogenous (Schou 2002; Jöst et al. 2006; Lehmijoki and Palokangas 
2010).  In  contrast  to  this  literature,  and  as  the  following  description  of  our  model’s 
mechanisms reveals, the presence of endogenous lifetime is of crucial importance for our 
results. 
     To the best of our knowledge, our paper is the first to explicitly consider environmental 
issues,  within  a  growth  model  where both  fertility  and  life  expectancy  are  endogenous,  thus 
suggesting  that  some  well documented  demographic  changes,  as  well  as  changes  to 
                                                 
1 See Galor (2005) and the references therein for a comprehensive discussion on the issue.   3 
economic  outcomes  such  as  economic  growth,  may  be  (partially)  attributed  to  factors 
associated  with  environmental  quality.  We  build  a  discrete time  overlapping  generations 
model in which both fertility decisions and life expectancy are endogenous. With respect to 
the latter, we account for the negative repercussions of pollution for the population’s health 
status. These repercussions are well documented and quantitatively significant: for example, 
Pimentel et al. (1998) argue that the direct and indirect effects of environmental degradation 
can account for almost 40% deaths worldwide.  
     Our  model  shows  that,  in  the  presence  of  emission  taxes,  the  process  of  economic 
growth  will  generate  sufficient  resources  for  entrepreneurs  to  opt  for  a  less  polluting 
production method.
2  When this happens,  the  reduction  in emissions  per  unit of  output 
causes an increase in longevity. Consequently, households will find optimal to increase their 
saving in order to carry more resources towards future consumption. In addition to a higher 
saving rate, the latter effect is also associated with a reduction in fertility. This is because 
households will try to smooth their consumption profile by providing more labour when 
young, with the purpose of counteracting the adverse effect of a higher saving rate on their 
current consumption.  This  can only  be achieved by  a reduction  in  the time/effort they 
devote  towards  child  rearing;  hence  both  the  fertility  rate  and  the  growth  rate  of  the 
population fall.  
     The  structure  of  our  analysis  is  as  follows.  Section  2  describes  the  economy’s  main 
characteristics In Section 3 we show how pollution impinges on endogenous life expectancy. 
Section 4 analyses the model’s equilibrium while Section 5 derives the equilibrium growth 
rate.  In  Section  6  we  describe  the  mechanism  through  which  the  emission  rate  falls 
endogenously in the process of economic development. Section 7 presents the meain results 
concerning the joint determination of pollution per unit of output, economic growth, fertility 
and longevity. In Section 8 we conclude.  
                 
 
                                                 
2 A study carried by the OECD (2007) supports the idea that environmentally related taxes encourage changes 
in production processes that are based on cleaner production techniques and environmental R&D. There is 
also  support  for  another  characteristic  of  our  mechanism  –  that  is,  the  fact  that  higher  GDP  growth  is 
positively  associated  with  the  promotion  of  new  technologies  that  are  directed  towards  environmental 
improvements. See Komen et al. (1997), Requate and Unold (2003), and Requate (2005) among others.   4 
2   The Economy 
We construct an overlapping generations model in which time takes form of discrete periods 
which are indexed by  0,1,2,... t = . In addition to a government, every period there are two 
groups of agents active in the economy. Henceforth, we shall be referring to these distinct 
groups as households and entrepreneurs.  
     At the beginning of each period, a unit mass of entrepreneurs comes into existence. Each 
of them lives for only one period and enjoys utility by consuming units of the economy’s 
final good.
3 She is endowed with a technology that allows her to combine labour units from 
households, denoted  it L , and capital from financial intermediaries, denoted  it K , to produce 




it it t it y BK A L
- = ,  (1) 
where  0 B >   and  0 1 β < < .  The  variable  t A   indicates  some  type  of  labour augmenting 
technological progress which, following Frankel (1962) and Romer (1986), we assume that is 
related to the average capital per worker ratio according to a learning by doing externality. 










= ∫ ,   Θ 0 > .  (2) 
where  t N  is the total population of young households/workers.
4 The entrepreneur sells her 
product  to  perfectly  competitive  firms  who  combine  all  the  available  varieties  of 








t it Y y di
- -  
=  
  ∫ ,  (3) 
where  1 σ >   is  the  elasticity  of  substitution  between  different  varieties  of  intermediate 
inputs. We shall assume that the final good is the numéraire and that the price of each 
intermediate good is denoted  it ρ . 
     As a result of her activity, each entrepreneur is responsible for the emission of  0 it p >  
units of pollution per unit of intermediate good produced. Therefore, the total pollutants 
                                                 
3 Thus, profit maximisation corresponds to utility maximisation.  
4 In what follows, the terms ‘worker’ and ‘household’ will be used interchangeably.    5 
emitted  by  each  entrepreneur  are  it it p y .  We  assume  that  the  government  follows  an 
environmental policy characterised by a proportional emission tax  0 τ >  imposed to each 
entrepreneur.  Given  this,  the  net  revenue  available  to  each  entrepreneur  is  (1 ) it it τp y - . 
Naturally, we assume that  1 it τp <  is satisfied.  
     Denoting the marginal cost of production by  t m , we can write the entrepreneur’s variable 
profits as  
  [ (1 ) ]
variable
it it it t it ̟ ρ τp m y = - - .  (4) 
The reason why we have labelled the profits in (4) as variable is because entrepreneurs have 
the choice of reducing their emissions and, therefore, their tax obligation by incurring a fixed 
cost,  denoted  0 ε > ,  for  a  clean up  operation  that  decreases  the  emission  rate  of  their 
technology. In particular, we assume that the entrepreneurial technology will either emit 
it p p =  pollutants per unit of production, if no such fixed cost is incurred, or  it p p =  units 
of pollution per unit of production, if the entrepreneur decides to incur this cost. Naturally, 
we assume that  p p > .
















 - = 
.  (5) 
     The economy is also inhabited by reproductive households who face a potential lifetime 
of three periods and belong to overlapping generations. The three periods of a household’s 
lifetime are childhood, young adulthood and old adulthood and its members make their decisions 
only after they reach their adulthood. At the beginning of their young adulthood, they are 
endowed with a unit of time which they decide to allocate between labour and child rearing. 
For each unit of labour supplied to entrepreneurial firms households receive the competitive 
salary  t w  while rearing each child caries a time/effort cost of  0 q > . Denoting the total 
number of children raised by each household by  t n , the previous assumptions imply that 
household members will supply 1 t qn -  units of labour.  
                                                 
5 We do not necessarily need to associate this scenario with a technology choice. We can equivalently interpret 
this choice as one where, by incurring the fixed cost, entrepreneurs can eliminate a fraction  (0,1) ζ Î  of their 
total ‘end of pipe’ emissions. In this case,  (1 ) p ζ p = - .      6 
     Each young household also receives a transfer, 
young
t H , from the government – a transfer 
which is proportional to labour income according to  (1 )
young young
t t t t H h w qn = -  ( 0
young
t h > ). 
Households decide how much to consume and how much to save for retirement, given that, 
when  old,  nature  does  not  bestow  to  them  a  labour  endowment  and,  therefore,  any 
alternative source of income from which they could finance their future consumption needs. 
With  the  purpose  of  introducing  endogenous lifetime  we follow  Bhattacharya  and  Qiao 
(2007)  by  assuming  that  households  face  a  limited  lifetime  once  they  enter  their  old 
adulthood. In particular, they will live for only a fraction  [0,1) t ψ Î  of their prospective 
maturity  period.  We  also  assume  that  retirement  income  (i.e.,  the  income  accrued  from 
saving) is received by agents at the very beginning of their old age and that it is augmented 
by a proportional subsidy  1
old
t H + . Denoting saving by  t s  and the gross rate of interest on 
deposits by  1 t r + , we have  1 1
old old
t t t t H h r s + + =  ( 0
old
t h > ).
6 Consequently, a household’s lifetime 
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+  denotes consumption 
during  old  adulthood.  Notice  that  we  follow  the  standard  approach  of  assuming  that 
households have preferences over the number of children they raise.
8   
     Earlier, we indicated that the government imposes a tax  (0,1/ ) t τ p Î  on total emissions 
by each entrepreneur. With a unit mass of entrepreneurs, this action results in total revenues 
of 
1
0 it it τ p y di ∫ . The government uses its revenues to finance the income transfer to all young 
households,  (1 )
young young
t t t t t t H N h w qn N = - , the subsidy to the retirement income of all old 
households,  1 1 1
old old
t t t t t t H N h r s N - - - = , and government consumption which is denoted  t g . 
The government has to abide by a balanced budget rule. Hence,    
 
1
1 1 0 (1 )
young old
it it t t t t t t t t t τ p y di h w qn N h r s N g - - = - + + ∫ .  (7) 
                                                 
6 The same assumption behind the use of government subsidies is employed in Varvarigos (2011). 
7 In the utility function, a superscript indicates the period where the agent is born while the subscript indicates 
the period in which the actual activity takes place.  
8 See Galor and Weil (1996), Palivos (2001), Blackburn and Cipriani (2002), Azarnert (2004) and Liao (2011) 
among others.   7 
      As we noted earlier, the presence of endogenous longevity is crucial for the interactions 
between  saving  and  fertility  choices.  In  the  section  that  follows,  we  describe  how  the 
emission of pollutants impinges on the population’s life expectancy. 
      
3   Longevity and Pollution 
Following  others  (Chakraborty  2004;  Bhattacharya  and  Qiao  2007;  Varvarigos  2010)  we 
assume that a household’s lifetime is endogenous. Particularly, we assume that  t ψ  is given by  
  Ψ( ) t t ψ x = ,  (8)   
where  t x  is a variable that describes the health profile of the household.
9 The function in (8) 
satisfies Ψ 0 ¢ > , Ψ 0 ¢¢< , Ψ(0) 0 = , Ψ( ) (0,1) λ ¥ = Î , Ψ (0) 0 φ ¢ = >  and Ψ ( ) 0 ¢ ¥ = .  
     Existing empirical evidence shows that as economies develop and people become more 
educated, they are more prone to adopt a lifestyle that contributes to an improvement in 
their overall health status (e.g. Smith 1999). Another crucial factor that seems to have a 
profound effect on health is environmental quality. For instance, various by products of 
economic activity, such as toxins, smoke, chemicals and litter, erode the quality of air as well 
as  the  quality  of  natural  resources  such  as  water,  soil  etc.  Consequently,  they  result  in 
significant  adverse  effects  on  the  health  status  of  people  who  are  exposed  to  such 
environments. Various empirical studies appear to confirm this conjecture (e.g. Pimentel et 
al. 1998; Brunekreef and Holgate 2002; Donohoe 2004; Lacasaña et al., 2005). 
     We try to capture the aforementioned ideas by assuming that the variable  t x  is related to 
average income per capita,  t Y , and pollution, denoted  t   , according to  ( , ) t t t x X Y   = . In 
general, this function satisfies  0
t Y X >  and   0
t   X <  but, for analytical purposes, we shall be 








= .  (9) 
Other  analyses  that introduce  the negative effect of pollution  on  longevity  are  those  of 
Varvarigos (2010), Mariani et al. (2010) and Jouvet et al. (2010). Recall that, in our setting, 
pollution  is  a  by product  of  entrepreneurial  activities  in  the  production  of  intermediate 
                                                 
9 Notice that the expected lifespan of a household is  2 t ψ + . For this reason, we will be making use of such 
terms as ‘life expectancy’ and ‘longevity’ interchangeably.         8 
goods. To maintain analytical tractability, without altering the strength of the mechanisms 
that permeate our subsequent results, we follow Stokey (1998), Jones and Manuelli (2001) 
and Hartman and Kwon (2005) and focus our attention the flow of pollution. Given our 
previous discussion, this is generated by  
 
1
0 t it it   p y di =∫ .  (10) 
      The preceding discussion completes the description of our theoretical framework. In the 
following section, we derive and characterise the equilibrium of our model. 
  
4   Equilibrium 
We shall begin the derivation of the model’s equilibrium by solving the profit maximisation 
problem of an entrepreneur. As we indicated in Section 2, the entrepreneur’s choice on the 
cleanliness of technology she will employ is discrete; hence it can be separated from her 
other choices. For this reason, we shall solve the problem using two distinct steps. In the 
first step, an entrepreneur will choose the amount of capital and labour she will employ, as 
well as the price of her product, for any technology described by  it p . In the second step, she 
will choose the technology she will implement by comparing her total after tax profits in 
each case, taking account of the results from the first step of the optimisation procedure.  
     First of all, we can use (3) to find that profit maximisation by the (perfectly competitive) 
producers of final goods will lead to the demand function  
 
σ
it it t y ρ Y
- = .  (11) 










.  (12) 
The result in (12) is the standard condition according to which the price is set as a mark up 
over the marginal cost of production  t m .  
     Concerning the choice of capital and labour employed in production, cost minimisation 
leads to
10   
                                                 
10  The  cost  minimisation  problem  is 
, min
it it
t it t it K L w L R K +   subject  to  equation  (1).  It  is  solved  by  using  the 
Lagrangean 
1 Λ ( )
β β
t t it t it t it it t it w L R K m y BK A L




t t it t it w m β BK A L
- - = - ,  (13) 
and  
 
1 1 ( )
β β
t t it t it R m βBK A L
- - = ,  (14) 
where  t R  is the rental cost of capital while the marginal cost  t m  is associated with the 
Lagrange  multiplier  of  the  cost  minimisation  problem.  Furthermore,  the  fact  that 
intermediate  good  producers  operate  under  monopolistic  competition  implies  that  the 
equilibrium  will  be symmetric  across entrepreneurs.  That  is,  it t ρ ρ = ,  it t K K = ,  it t L L = , 
it t p p =   and  it t y y =   for  every  i .  For  this  reason,  we  drop  the  subscript  i   from  the 
subsequent analysis. 
     Using (3) and (11), these arguments imply that  1 t ρ = . We can substitute this result in (12) 
to derive  
 
1





= - .  (15) 
Substituting (15) in (13) and (14) yields  
 
1 1
(1 ) (1 )
β β β
t t t t t
σ
w τp β BK A L
σ
- - -




(1 ) ( )
β β
t t t t t
σ
R τp βBK A L
σ
- - -
= - ,  (17) 




t t t t t Y y BK A L
- = = ,  (18) 
while (4) and (15) imply that each entrepreneur’s variable profits are equal to  
 
variable 1
(1 ) t t t ̟ τp y
σ
= - .  (19) 
     We now turn our attention to the optimal decisions made by households. Given that 
1 t ρ = ,  the  budget  constraints  faced  by  households  during  the  two  periods  of  their 
adulthood are 
1 (1 ) (1 )
t young
t t t t t c h w qn s
- = + - -  and 
1
1 1 (1 )
t old
t t t t c h r s
-










+  to maximise their lifetime utility in (6), taking  t ψ ,  t w  and  1 t r +  as 
given. It is straightforward to establish that the solutions to this problem are given by    10 
  (1 ) (1 )
1
young t
t t t t
t
ψ















.  (21) 
     The  intuition  behind  these  results  is  straightforward.  Equation  (20)  reveals  that 
households will save a fraction of their total earnings (that is, labour income augmented by 
the  government  subsidy).  Their  propensity  to  save  is  increasing  in  the  variable  that 
determines  their  life  expectancy.  In  particular,  a higher  t ψ   increases  the  marginal  utility 
benefit of consuming when old; hence, it motivates agents to substitute future for current 
consumption. In equation (21), we can see that the fertility rate is inversely related to  t ψ  
because, as the utility from consuming when old increases, households will optimally want to 
carry  more  resources  towards  saving.  Nevertheless,  they  will  also  try  to  smooth  their 
consumption profile. They can do this by working more during their young adulthood in 
order to increase their available resources – an action which, nevertheless, leaves them with 
less time available to rear children. 
     Next, we can combine (8), (9) and (10) together with  t t y Y =  to get  Ψ(1/ ) t t ψ p = , where 
Ψ 0
t p < .
11 Substituting this in (21) yields  









.  (22) 
The result in equation (22) allows us to derive 
 
Lemma 1. The optimal fertility rate is positively related to the amount of emissions per unit on output. 
That is  ( ) 0 t n p ¢ > .   
 




















 and Ψ 0
t p < , we get  ( ) 0 t n p ¢ > .   □ 
                                                 
11  The  functional  form  in  (9)  allows  us  to  eliminate  the  direct  effect  of  t t y Y =   on  t ψ   due  to  the 
counterbalancing effects of economic development and pollution. This is actually a welcomed aspect because it 
permits us to focus on the demographic implications of different emission rates. In any case, later it will 
become clear that income still has a positive, albeit indirect, effect through the contribution of the growth 
process on the choice of a lower  t p .       11 
 
     In terms of intuition, a higher  t p  reduces longevity because of the adverse health effect 
from the emission of harmful pollutants. As this reduces the relative importance attached to 
old age consumption, the equilibrium can only be restored by a reallocation of resources that 
favours the rearing of more children.  
 
5   Capital Accumulation 
The  engine  of  output  growth  in  our  economy  is  the  accumulation  of  physical  capital. 
Furthermore, growth can be sustained in the long run due to the presence of a learning by 
doing  externality  in  the  determination  of  labour  productivity.  Capital  is  accumulated  by 
perfectly  competitive  financial  intermediaries  who  accept  deposits  by  young  workers  in 
exchange for the gross rate of return  1 t r +  per unit of deposited income. They subsequently 
transform these saving deposits into capital by accessing a technology that transforms one 
unit  of  time t   output  into  one  unit  of  time  1 t +   capital.  The  capital  is  supplied  to 
intermediate good producers at a rental cost of  1 t R +  per unit.  
     Evidently, the zero profit condition for financial intermediaries implies that
12 
  1 1 t t r R + + = .  (23) 
Furthermore, we have  
  1 t t t K N s + = ,  (24) 
which indicates that the collective savings by all young households (whose population is  t N ) 
are the inputs in the investment process that leads to the formation of physical capital. Of 
course,  the  demographics  of  our  economy  imply  that  the  population  size  of  young 








+ = .  (25) 
Substituting (25) in (24) and using the notational standard  / t j t j t j k K N + + + =  ( 0,1,... j = ), 








+ = .  (26) 
                                                 
12 We assume full depreciation of capital.    12 
Using (2), (26) and  (1 ) t t t L N qn = -  in (16) and (17) we get  
 
1 1
(1 ) (1 ) Θ (1 )
β β
t t t t
σ
w τp β B k qn
σ
- - -








R τp βB qn
σ
- - -
= - - ,  (28) 
respectively.  
     Earlier, we indicated that the government imposes a proportional tax on emissions and 
uses  the  proceeds  to  finance  a  programme  of  transfers/subsidies  to  (young  and  old) 
households, as well as government consumption expenses.  Now, we shall assume that this 
programme of transfers/subsidies is designed to eradicate the cost accrued to households, as 
a result of the taxation of pollutant emissions. We justify this assumption by appealing to the 
idea that workers/savers do not have any control on whether a cleaner production process 
will be applied or not. This choice rests with the entrepreneurs. For this reason, it may be 
proper to ‘correct’ any negative repercussions that accrue to them for choices over which 
they have no control whatsoever.   
     Given  these  arguments,  we  postulate  that  the  programme  of  transfers/subsidies  is 
designed so that  
 
1 1 1
(1 ) (1 ) (1 ) Θ (1 )
young β β
t t t t t
σ
h w qn β B k qn
σ
- - -






(1 ) Θ (1 )
old β β
t t t t t
σ





+ = - .  (30)   
Effectively, the scheme is designed in a manner that eliminates the term (1 ) t τp -  from the 
returns to labour and capital (which is also the return to saving according to equation 23). 











.  (31)   
Substituting  (31)  back  to  the  government’s  budget  constraint,  we  can  eventually  obtain 
government consumption as  
 
1
t t t g τp y
σ
= .  (32)     13 
     We are now ready to obtain the economy’s growth rate. First, we substitute (20), (22), 
(27) and (31) in (26). Subsequently, some straightforward algebra allows us to derive  
 
1
1 1 Ψ(1/ ) ( 1)(1 ) Θ










+   + + - -
- = = -   +  
.  (33) 
As we can see, the growth rate of capital per worker is a function of the emission rate  t p . 
There are two ways through which the latter impinges on the economy’s growth rate, both 
of them working through the emission rate’s effect on life expectancy. On the one hand, the 
emission rate determines the marginal propensity to save – thus, the funds available for 
investment; on the other hand, it also affects fertility decisions and, correspondingly, the rate 
of population growth as well as the amount of labour that households offer. As it turns out, 
all these effects work on the same direction, thus leading to the result in  
 
Lemma 2. The growth rate of capital per worker is negatively related to the amount of emissions per unit of 
output. That is  ( ) 0 t κ p ¢ < .   
 
Proof.  Using  (33),  it  is  straightforward  to  establish  that 
1 ( 1)(1 ) Θ Ψ 1 Ψ(1/ ) Ψ(1/ )
( ) 1 0






σ β B q γ p p γ
κ p β
σγ p p γ p
- - -     + + ¢ = - <     + + + +    
 
because Ψ 0
t p < .    □ 
 
     Earlier, we established that a higher  t p  reduces longevity. This effect causes a reduction 
in the marginal propensity to save, thus reducing the amount of saving for a given amount of 
labour income. Furthermore, by leading to an increase in the fertility rate, the reduction in 
labour supply reduces disposable income available for saving. Finally, the higher rate of 
population growth implies a direct reduction in the amount of investment per household. All 
these effects result in a lower rate of growth. In what follows, and given the result in Lemma 
2, we shall be assuming that parameter values are such that  ( ) 0 κ p > ; that is, the growth rate 
of capital per worker is still positive even with the highest possible emission rate.   
          
   14 
6   Endogenous Determination of the Emission rate 
Recall that entrepreneurs will choose their emission per unit of production so as to maximise 
profits through the expression in (5), taking the supply of labour as given. Using (1), (2) and 






(1 ) Θ [1 ] , if 
1






τp B qn K p p
σ
̟








 - - - =

  (34) 
Of course, (34) reveals that the emission rate will be endogenously determined from  
 
ˆ , if 








  = 
 ³  










- = ,  (36) 
 and 
1 ( )(1 ) 0
β
t t Z τ p p qn
- = - - > .  Intuitively,  a  choice  of  lower  emissions  per  unit  of 
production  is  beneficial  in  terms  of  variable  profits  because  it  reduces  the  fraction  of 
revenues lost  in  the  form  of taxes. Nevertheless, given  the  fixed  cost associated  with a 
cleaner production process, this benefit will dominate only after the economy’s resources (in 
terms of capital) exceed the endogenous threshold given by  ˆ K .  
     Let  us  assume  that,  given  (22),  the  model’s  parameters  allow  ( ) 1 0 n p - > .  This  can 
happen, for example, for a sufficiently low value for  q. In  this case, taking account of 
Lemma 1 and equation (25), we can see that the growth rate of the population is always 
positive. Recalling that  ( ) 0 κ p > , it is true that the growth rate of the aggregate capital stock 
is positive as well, i.e., 





+ + + = > ; alternatively,  1 t t K K + > . Now, let us consider an 
economy  for  which  0 ˆ K K < .  Naturally,  there  must  be  some  period  1 T ³   such  that 
1 ˆ
T T K K K - < < . Hence, the determination of the emission rate can be formally described 
through   15 
 
Lemma 3. There is a time period  1 T ³  such that  
 
,    0,..., 1
,    , 1,...
t
p for t T
p




 = + 
.   
 
Proof. It follows directly from (35),  0 ˆ K K <  and  1 t t K K + > .   □        
 
     The  result  in  Lemma  3  will  have  significant  implications  for  issues  pertaining  to 
demographic changes in our economy. This is an issue to which we turn in the following 
section of our analysis.  
 
7   Growth, Fertility, and Longevity 
The  result  in  Lemma  3  indicates  that,  at  some  point  of  its  development  process,  the 
economy will experience a reduction in the pollutant emission rate. As we shall see, this 
outcome  has  significant  implications  for  both  demographic  and  economic  outcomes. 
Concerning the former, one major result comes in the form of  
 
Proposition 1. The economy will undergo a demographic transition in the sense that it will experience an 
increase in life expectancy and a reduction in the rate of population growth. In particular, there is a time 
period  1 T ³  such that    
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Proof. It follows from Lemma 1, Lemma 3, and Ψ 0
t p < .   □        
 
 
       
     
                  
                 




     
 
 
Figure 1. Demographic change 
      
     A similar distinct change can be observed in relation to the economy’s growth rate. This 
becomes evident in   
 
Proposition 2. There is a time period  1 T ³  such that    
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( )
( ),    , 1,...
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 = + 
,    ( ) ( ) κ p κ p < .   
 
Proof. It follows from Lemma 2 and Lemma 3.   □  
 
     The two previous propositions reveal that the economy will undergo a distinct change in 
both  its  economic  (i.e.,  output  growth)  and  demographic  (i.e.,  fertility  and  longevity) 
outcomes. The novelty of our analysis rests on the idea that environmental factors – that is, 
the choice of less polluting production processes induced by environmental policy – are 
crucial in the joint determination of economic growth and various aspects of demographic 
change.       
  t ψ   nt 
t  t 
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7   Conclusion 
In this paper, we have sought to fill a gap in the literature by analysing a model which shows 
that the interactions between economic growth and environmental factors can account for 
historically observed changes in some important demographic characteristics. Specifically, we 
offer a novel mechanism according to which the endogenous change of the emission rate, 
which occurs in presence of environmental taxation, brings forth a joint change in both life 
expectancy and fertility.  
     Our model is constructed in a manner that allows analytical solutions. Thus it benefits 
from  the  clear cut  and  detailed  description  of  all  the  mechanisms  involved  whereas  the 
absence of unnecessary complication allows us to avoid aspects that could blur the intuition. 
As always, the model can be enriched with elements that would allow us to study additional 
effects whose analysis do not comprise a part of this paper’s objective. For example, our 
main purpose was to isolate and study the causal effects that run from environmental factors 
to aspects of demographic change. It will be worthwhile to examine a model where such 
effects  are  two way  causal.  This  can  happen  if  we  generalise  the  expressions  describing 
pollution and life expectancy so as to account explicitly for the environmental strain caused 
by higher population growth. Furthermore, we could enrich the characteristics of population 
changes by allowing infant (in addition to adult) mortality. As stated earlier, these issues go 
beyond the purpose of our current study which seeks to focus on the causal effects of 
pollution  on  the  economy’s  demography.  Nevertheless,  they  are  indubitably  important; 
hence, they represent a potentially rewarding avenue for future research work.       
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